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Abstract 
Employee plays a key role in merger and acquisition integration, but relevant 
empirical research is scarce. John and Knyazev (2015) have done a research on how 
employee rights impact M&A performance in USA. Due to huge regime environment 
difference between China and USA, we believe the impact of employee rights on 
M&A performance in China is different from USA. Firstly, the relationship between 
employees and managers in China is different from that in United States. Thanks to 
the well developed union system in United States, the employee can effectively make 
influence on managers’ decision-making. However, union does not work effectively in 
China. Secondly, Chinese government acts in some degree like the union in USA. In 
this article, we empirically study the impact of acquirer employee rights on M&A 
performance under China’s special political atmosphere. 
We use M&A activities took place from 2008 to 2013 in Chinese stock market as 
study sample. We include only M&A activities in which listed companies are 
acquirers and the control rights of target are transferred after the transactions. Using 
CAR as the dependent variable and multiple linear regressions as the empirical 
method, we get conclusion as below. 
Firstly, when other conditions are controlled, the stronger “incentive employee 
right” the listed companies have, the better M&A performance the listed companies 
may get. 
The existence of “incentive employee right” implies that the managers of the 
listed companies cherish the value of their employees and are aware of appropriate 
incentive. Such trait of the listed companies may moderate resistance of employees in 
the target companies. And effective M&A integration helps improve the M&A 
performance.  
Secondly, the relation between “incentive employee right” and M&A 
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State-owned listed companies often search M&A transactions because of local 
government’s “Support hand” or “Robbing hand” sometimes the central government’s 
plan of industrial restructuring. So the State-owned listed companies have less 
motivation to reconstruct the employee of the target company. But private-owned 
listed companies seek M&A deals out of market principal and they have strong 
motivation to reconstruct the employee of the target company. So the employee of 
target companies may have strong resistance against private-owned listed companies 
as potential acquirer. 
Thirdly, when other conditions are controlled, the stronger “protective employee 
right” the listed companies have, the worse M&A performance the listed companies 
may get. 
Interest conflicts exist between shareholders and employees. The shareholders 
want the employees to work harder and maximize their personal wealth otherwise the 
employees want to maximize their personal leisure time “Protective employee right” 
increases the power of employee and makes them reluctant to work harder So the 
labor level of the company may not at optimal level which puts the wealth of 
shareholder in jeopardy. 
Fourthly, the relation between “protective employee right” and M&A 
performance may be weaker in private-owned listed companies. 
Chinese government has more impact on state-owned listed companies than 
private-owned companies. So the “Protective employee right” in private-owned 
companies is much weaker than that in state-owned listed companies. 
In order to make the results of this paper more robust, we used CAR of different 
time window and adjusted excessive employment degree to carry out Robustness 
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